Tenant security monitoring
Useful for
Introduction
The Microsoft tenant is an early control plane. It should be useful on day one, but it should also be monitored because identity compromise quickly becomes business compromise.
Default onmicrosoft.com domain
The default onmicrosoft.com domain is useful and should be understood, not ignored. It can help with tenant identification, early setup, recovery scenarios and separation between the permanent company domain and the underlying Microsoft tenant.
Record:
- the tenant name and default onmicrosoft.com domain
- who owns the tenant
- which custom domains are verified
- whether any accounts still rely on the default domain
- how the default domain is used in recovery or administration scenarios
The default domain should not become a confusing shadow identity surface. It should be documented as part of the tenant record.
Identity security alerts
The company should enable practical alerts and automated controls early. At minimum, consider:
- SSO configuration changes.
- Enterprise application consent changes.
- Conditional Access changes.
- MFA changes for administrators.
- PIM role assignment or activation changes.
- Break-glass account sign-in or credential change.
- Risky user detection.
- Automatic disablement or blocking of high-risk users where appropriate.
- High failed-login volume, for example 100 failed logins in one hour.
- Sign-ins from unusual locations or impossible travel where available.
- Privileged role assignment outside the expected process.
The exact implementation can mature over time, but the company should not run privileged identity without visibility. Alerts should have owners, response expectations and a route into the incident process.
Identity review cadence
Identity monitoring should become a recurring review, not only a set of alerts. Run identity security review loop to review:
- disabled, expired, stale or inactive identities
- guest users and accounts without a clear owner
- risky users and risky sign-ins
- PIM eligible assignments, activations, approvals and repeated activations
- SSO, enterprise application consent, Conditional Access and MFA changes
- break-glass sign-in or credential-change evidence
- failed-login, password spray, impossible travel or unusual-location alerts
After Production, the same review should mature to include access reviews, phishing resilience, identity assurance for high-risk roles, MFA strength and evidence suitable for customer assurance.
How this evolves as the company grows
- At company setup, tenant monitoring should cover risky users, suspicious sign-ins, failed login spikes and critical identity changes.
- Before POC, alerts should protect the small number of accounts and assets that could compromise everything.
- Before Production, identity review should include PIM activity, privileged role changes, enterprise app consent and break-glass access.
- As the company scales, identity security should include regular access reviews, phishing resilience and board-visible material risks.
What an agent should look for
- Are risky users and failed-login spikes monitored?
- Are PIM and privileged changes reviewed?
- Are identity risks escalated when material?
What good looks like
The company can explain the decision, show the evidence behind it and identify the next point where the control needs to mature.
How Brokenhouse helps
Turn this into a practical plan.
I help technology teams turn this guidance into decisions, implementation plans, governance evidence and production-ready operating models.
Talk through your situationNext guidance
Related decisions to work through
Agent-led consultancy should amplify judgement
Agents should not replace expert judgement. They should help capture, structure, challenge, and reuse it.
Azure Dev Platform Modernisation
Describe the organisation, product, team shape, delivery model, and operating constraints.
Agentic software delivery governance
Agents used by the delivery team need a different governance model from AI models embedded in the product. Delivery agents may not be part of the customer-facing service, but they can still create risk because they may read code, write code, inspect logs, summarise documents, generate infrastructure changes or draft customer-facing material.